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OSHA: THE DEFINITION OF "REPEATEDLY" IN
SECTION 666(a)
INTRODUCTION
The express purpose of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970' (Act) is "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions."'2 To insure that the promise is not an
empty one, Congress equipped the Act with its own civil and
criminal penalties, 3 as well as the means of enforcing them.'
The penalty provision states at section 666(a): "Any employer
who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of...
this chapter, may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than
$10,000 for each violation."'5 In comparison, violations of the
Act classified only as "serious" or "non-serious" are punishable
by civil penalties not to exceed $1,000.6 The distinction in the
size of the penalty demonstrates why employers will want to
avoid having violations classified as "willful" or "repeated,"
and why they must know with some degree of certainty what
violations can properly be cited under section 666(a).
29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1970).
Id. § 651(b).
Id. § 666.
* Id. § 657-60.
Id. § 666(a) (emphasis added).
* Id. §§ 666(b), (c). A serious violation is defined in section 6660) as one which
creates a "substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result."
The Act does not define "non-serious," but it would presumably apply to a violation
creating less risk of harm to the employee.
I This comment deals exclusively with the problem in the interpretation of
"repeatedly." A similar controversy exists with regard to the classification of violations
as "willful." The issues raised by that debate are related to those involved in the
following analysis:
The Third Circuit takes the position in Irey v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir.
1974), that a "willful" violation is one which is evidenced by a reckless defiance of the
Act, a "flaunting" of the Act. Several circuits disagree and define "willful" as merely
a conscious disregard of the requirements of the Act regardless of the motive. See, e.g.,
Western Waterproofing, Inc. v. Marshall, 576 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 452 (1978); Intercounty Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1072 (1976); U.S. v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78
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The present state of the law does not provide that cer-
tainty. The courts of appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits
disagree as to the definition of "repeatedly. '8 The Review Com-
missioners9 have just recently reached agreement on the sub-
ject, 1 but not in a very forceful or persuasive opinion. This
uncertainty, coupled with the previous lack of uniformity in
the decisions of the administrative law judges," suggests the
(10th Cir. 1975). The matter is presently unresolved.
For a discussion of "willful," see Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed. 551 (1977). See also note
12, infra.
Compare George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978), with Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976).
I At this point it is useful to detail the procedures for enforcement and judicial
review provided in §§ 659-60 of the Act. When an employer is cited for a violation by
the Secretary of Labor, a request for a contest action must be filed within fifteen days
or the Secretary's order becomes final. If contested, the case is heard by an administra-
tive law judge, referred to under the original Act as a Hearing Examiner. The judge's
decision carries the same weight as that of the Commission. If either the employer or
the Secretary of Labor wishes to appeal the decision of the judge, the Commission can
request review by the vote of one of its three members. If either party desires to appeal
that Commission decision, § 660(a) provides for appeal to a federal circuit court upon
order of the Commission. The problem raised by § 660(a) is discussed in the text
accompanying note 46 infra.
"' Commissioner Moran had been the principal advocate of the Bethlehem Steel
approach on the Commission (see note 26, infra) but he is no longer serving. His
position was filled by Commissioner Cottine in May, 1978, and the first demonstration
of his view on the matter is Potlatch Corp., [1979] Occupational Safety and Health
Review Decisions [hereinafter cited as OSHD] (CCH) 23,294 (January 29, 1979).
In that case, Potlatch Corporation was cited for a repeated violation of a regulation
dealing with electrical switches at its sawmill. The issue in that case involved the
similarity between the violations which formed the basis for a finding of
"repeatedness." The administrative law judge found enough difference between the
violations to remove them from the "repeated" category. The Secretary of Labor filed
the petition directing review which was granted by the Commission; Potlatch chose
not to file a brief in opposition. The Commission found that for a violation to be
"repeated," the second violation need only be substantially similar to the first and,
"in light of the decisions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits," one prior violation may
support a finding of "repeated." Although the Commission's decision is finally unani-
mous on the issue, and will bring consistency to the administrative law judges who are
bound to follow the Commission, the Potlatch opinion lacks any well-reasoned argu-
ments in support of its position and also contains no refutation of the Bethlehem Steel
approach. Until the Third Circuit argument is effectively refuted or withdrawn, the
conflict still very much exists between the circuits.
11 A search through the decisions of the various administrative law judges on the
issue of "repeated" violations, which were widely divergent before Potlatch, see note
10 supra, reveals a marked change in results after the Third Circuit decided Bethlehem
Steel in July, 1976. Most decisions before that date classified any second violation as
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need for affirmative guidance. 2
The conflict evidenced by two principal cases, Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission3 and George Hyman Construction Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, "will serve as the
basis for an analysis of this problem as it presently exists under
the Act.
I. THE CONFLICT
A. Bethlehem Steel Corp: v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission
Bethlehem Steel was cited for violating a general house-
keeping regulation twice in the period of a few months.5 The
second citation was classified as "repeated" and a $60 penalty
was proposed. 6 The administrative law judge who heard
Bethlehem Steel held that this was not the type of violation
intended to be treated under section 666(a); rather, this viola-
tion should have been treated independently, taking the prior
violations into consideration only in setting the penalty. 7
"repeated;" see e.g., Linbeck Construction Corp., [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH) 20,262
(December 31, 1975); but decisions since that time have tended to classify second
violations as "repeated" only if the employer flaunted the Act. See e.g., Seattle Seve-
dore Co., [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH) 21,128 (August 24, 1976).
In General Electric Co., [1974-1975] OSHD (CCH) 19,567 (April 21, 1975),
Commissioner Cleary advanced, for the first time, the argument that an employer
must flaunt the Act to merit classification as a "repeat" violator. Since the Third
Circuit adopted that idea, Cleary has abandoned it. See, e.g., George Hyman Con-
struction Co., [1977-1978] OSHD (CCH) 21,774 (April 26, 1977) (opinion by Cleary,
Commissioner).
12 It is doubtful that the Supreme Court will provide such guidance in light of the
denial of certiorari in Western Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Marshall, 576 F.2d 139 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 452 (1978), which deals with a similar split among
the circuits as to the definition of "willfully" under the Act.
13 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976).
" 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978).
The specific regulation is found at 29 C.F.R. § 1915.51(a) (1974). The actual
regulation violated in each case is not significant to an understanding of the problem,
however, since employers rarely contest the fact of the violation but only challenge the
classification of the violation as "repeated." In Bethlehem Steel, the parties stipulated
prior to the initial hearing that the violation had occurred but disagreed as to its
characterization.
15 It is questionable whether so much controversy is warranted in light of the small
size of the penalty. See note 34 infra for a discussion of this proposition.
17 [1974-1977] OSHD (CCH) 19,191 (Jan. 20, 1975).
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Upon review by the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (Commission), that decision was reversed
and the $60 penalty reassessed. 8 The Commission held that the
mere recurrence of a previously cited violation is sufficient to
constitute a "repeated" violation. The Third Circuit reversed
the Commission in favor of the determination made by the
administrative law judge. 9 The court based its findings on a
belief that Congress intended to deal only with the most fla-
grant violations under section 666(a). In support of this view,
the court noted the severity of the possible penalties provided
and the joining of the terms "willfully" and "repeatedly" in the
same provision." Further, it stressed that violations warranting
citation and penalty, but not rising to the level of "willful" or
"repeated," can be adequately handled under section 666(b)
and section 666 (c)0 1 The court concluded that a violation can
only be classified as "repeated" if it is preceded by at least two
independent violations of the same standard and if the em-
ployer's conduct exhibits a "flaunting" of the requirements of
the Act. 21 One prior citation could never be the basis of a
"repeated" violation. 23
,s [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH) 19,996 (Sept. 17, 1975).
' Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 540
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976). The court thoroughly dissected the dictionary definition of
"repeatedly" and concluded that the word in its adverbial form connotes constant or
frequent repetition. This semantic analysis drew strong criticism from the Fourth
Circuit in the George Hyman case; see text accompanying note 28 infra.
" 540 F.2d at 161. The current § 666 resulted from a compromise between the two
houses of Congress. The Senate proposed only a criminal penalty for "willful" viola-
tions, whereas the House version provided for civil penalties much like those in the
present § 666(a). Subsection (e) was added as a compromise, imposing criminal penal-
ties only if death results from a "willful" violation. [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5177, 5237. Although both sides of this controversy claim support in the legisla-
tive history, what little history exists is generally inconclusive on the subject and
legislative intent is merely a matter of conjecture.
1, These sections of the Act deal with serious and non-serious violations. For a
discussion of such violations, see note 6 supra.
22 540 F.2d at 162. This test is essentially the same one applied by the Third
Circuit to the question of "willfullness" in Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd en banc, 519 F.2d 1215
(3d Cir. 1975). That test has met substantial opposition. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed.
551 (1977), for a discussion of the problems in interpretation of "willful."
2 540 F.2d at 162 n.11.
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B. George Hyman Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission
This question was more recently considered by the Fourth
Circuit in George Hyman Construction Co. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission.24 The Hyman Com-
pany was cited for six violations of construction standards, four
of which had been cited once previously and two of which had
been cited twice previously. The administrative law judge af-
firmed the characterization of the citations as "repeated,"2 but
on review the three member Commission split three ways. Each
commissioner proposed a different solution, resulting in an af-
firmation of the judge's decision.
The Fourth Circuit, in direct disagreement with the Third
Circuit's decision in Bethlehem Steel, also affirmed. It adopted
the view that the "common usage of the term connotes only
that a single prior infraction need be proved to invoke the
repeated violation sanction authorized by the Act." The court
criticized the Bethlehem Steel approach as resting on a
"strained semantical argument."'
In Bethlehem Steel, the Third Circuit placed great empha-
sis on the fact that "willfully" and "repeatedly" are combined
together in section 666(a), evidencing congressional intent to
treat the two similarly. 2 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in
George Hyman discerned that the intent of Congress was to
differentiate between these two requirements, with
"repeatedly" applying to recurrent violations that do not rise
to the level of "willfulness."3 0 Under this approach, any second
21 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978).
[1976-1977] OSHD (CCH) 20,721 (April 19, 1976). It is significant to note
that the administrative law judge decided this case prior to the Third Circuit's opinion
in Bethlehem Steel.
21 [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH) 21,744 (April 26, 1977). Chairman Barnako
agreed with the Bethlehem Steel decision that the "repeated" classification was de-
signed to cover more flagrant violations, but he disagreed that a "repeated" violation
must be preceded by at least two prior violations. He has since reversed his position;
see note 10 supra. Commissioner Cleary's opinion is essentially the same as the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in George Hyman, which requires only a second violation. Commis-
sioner Moran agreed completely with the Bethlehem Steel approach.
2 582 F.2d at 839.
Id. See note 19 supra, for a discussion of the semantic argument.
540 F.2d at 161.
" 582 F.2d at 840. The court relied on the use of the disjunctive "or" as evidence
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violation is per se "repeated." "
The persuasiveness of the Geoge Hyman opinion3' is but-
tressed by the fact that, at the present time, the same view is
taken by the Secretary of Labor in the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's Field Operations Manual.3 2 A
"repeated" violation is defined therein as simply "another vio-
lation" of a "previously cited" standard.33 The essential ele-
ment under this definition as well as the definition employed
by the Fourth Circuit is proof of a prior violation. 4
of "congressional intent to identify two distinct categories of violation," each to be
treated differently. Id. at n.10.
1, The Ninth Circuit is the only other circuit which has considered this question.
In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 566 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977), the
citation classified as "repeated" was for a violation identical to one cited three months
earlier. Although Todd Shipyards builds and repairs a large number of vessels, the two
violations occurred on the same ship and the court apparently felt such circumstances
constituted a serious violation. The court specifically declined to follow Bethlehem
Steel. It gave no indication as to how it would define "repeatedly;" it merely affirmed
the citations because of the small penalties assessed.
A strong dissent was filed, however, by Judge Kennedy, urging acceptance of the
Bethlehem Steel approach. 566 F.2d at 1332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2 Field Operations Manual, ch. VIII, (B)(4), 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH Gums
(CCH) 4360.2. (This manual was first issued in May, 1974, to replace the Compliance
Operations Manual. It is updated when necessary.)
3 In the Field Operations Manual, a "repeated" violation is described as follows:
a. Violation of any standard regulation, rule, order, or the general duty
clause may be cited as repeated under Section 17(a) [666(a)] where, upon
reinspection, another violation of the previously cited section of a standard,
regulation, rule, order or condition violating the general duty clause is found.
b. Repeated violations differ from willful violations in that they may result
from an inadvertent, accidental or ordinarily negligent act. A willful viola-
tion need not be one for which the employer has been previously cited. Where
a repeated violation also meets the criteria for willful, a citation for willful
violation will be issued.
Id. (emphasis in original).
2 This matter is further complicated by recent decisions which suggest there is
no need to resolve this issue at all if the penalties are under $1,000.00. Those decisions
point out that, as long as the proposed penalty is less than $1,000.00, the violation can
be classified as "willful," "repeated," "serious," or "non-serious" and still be proper
under the Act. Only those violations which are penalized in an amount greater than
$1,000 must be classified as "willful" or "repeated" to be appropriate. See, e.g., Turner
Construction Co., 3 EmPL. SAFn & HEALTH GumE 22,774 (April 17, 1978), in which
the administrative law judge simply affirmed penalties of $420 and $560 without deter-
mining whether the violations were "repeated," since such a determination is, as a
practical matter, unnecessary when the monetary penalty is less than $1,000.
1978-79] 1059
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II. ADVANTAGES OF THE Bethlehem Steel APPROACH
The penalty provisions of the Act carefully differentiate
among several distinct types of violations. 5 The categories are
quite broad, however, and leave much to the discretion of the
Secretary of Labor and the Review Commission. 6 The passage
of the Act in 1970 was accompanied by the usual legislative
debate,37 yet little of it is relevant to section 666. Interestingly,
both sides read the compromise 38 that brought about the pres-
ent section as supporting their own position. To do so, each side
must inject many of its own beliefs and opinions into the deter-
mination of the often elusive "congressional intent." The
Bethlehem Steel approach is advantageous then, not for its
analysis of legislative history, but for the manner in which it
treats section 666(a) in light of the whole Act.
Perhaps the most important provision of section 666 is
subsection (i), which reads:
The commission shall have authority to assess all civil penal-
ties provided in this section, giving due consideration to the
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the
business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the
violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of
previous violation. 9
.Since the Commission can consider previous violations in es-
tablishing all monetary penalties, section 666(a) should not be
invoked every time a second violation is involved. As one cir-
cuit judge explained, "[I]f every second offender were a re-
peated violator it would make no sense for the statute to direct
that the history of violations be considered in assessing the
relatively minor penalties for single violations."4 Section
29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
3 Citations for violations of the Act are issued by the Department of Labor
through the Secretary and his inspectors. A proposed penalty is submitted along with
the citation which the Commission may, in its discretion, accept or reject. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 658-59 (1970).
1, [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177.
" See note 20, supra for a discussion of this compromise.
3, 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970).
10 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 566 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also George Hyman Construction Co., [1977-1978]
OSHD (CCH) 21,774 (April 26, 1977) (opinion of Barnako, Cha;rman).
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666(i) thus provides the means to assess a higher penalty for
a second violation without classifying the violation as "re-
peated" for purposes of section 666(a).
The Bethlehem Steel manner of handling "willfully" and
"repeatedly" alike also seems to be more desirable. The possi-
ble penalty for such violations is ten times greater than the.
possible penalty for other violations.4' In Irey v. OSHR,2 the
Third Circuit expressed its belief that the possible severity of
these penalties indicates that these types of violations are con-
sidered to be far worse than "serious" violations. Although Irey
dealt only with violations classified as "willful," the Bethlehem
Steel opinion makes it clear that the Third Circuit also feels
the same about "repeated" violations. Since the penalty can be
so much greater, the conduct Warranting that penalty must be
much more flagrant than is found in a "serious" violation.
George Hyman placed "willful" violations on a level above
"repeated" violations, based on the use of the disjunctive "or"
in the statute and its own notion of congressional intent. Any
such classification cannot be logically founded in light of the
absence of actual legislative intent, since the possible penalties
are clearly the same for "willful" and "repeated" violations.
The Bethlehem Steel approach also allows more flexibility
to the Commission and the Secretary. Under George Hyman,
the second violation of the same standard or regulation is per
se "repeated," the only real proof requirement being whether
it is the same standard or regulation, or whether the violation
is substantially similar to the prior violation.43 Under
Bethlehem Steel, however, the basic element is a "flaunting"
of the Act. Therefore, if an employer is found guilty of violating
several different regulations over a period of time and has suffi-
ciently "flaunted" the Act, the Secretary could cite him for
"repeatedly" violating the general duty requirement of section
654 which is a fundamental purpose of the Act. All involved
would benefit from such a means of ensuring safe working con-
ditions.
" See text accompanying notes 5 and 6 supra.
42 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974). See note 7 supra for the status of the controversy
over "willfully."
1 See Potlatch Corp. [1979] OSHD (CCH) 23,294 (January 29, 1979), and note
10 supra for the most recent Commission action in this area.
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The employer who is not deterred by several citations is
the employer that section 666(a) was intended to treat as a
repeated violator. The more sizeable penalty is intended to
produce the permanent adoption of methods of operation ac-
ceptable under the Act, rather than promoting temporary com-
pliance merely to avoid section 666(d), which provides for daily
penalties for uncorrected violations." The Fourth Circuit con-
fused this notion in stating that "the crux of the repeated viola-
tion penalty is failure to correct safety hazards. 4 5 Such a read-
ing of section 666(a) essentially renders subsection (i) and (d)
superfluous.
A practical reason for preferring uniformity in the law in
this area is the prevention of a type of forum shopping which
is possible under the Act. Section 660 provides for appeal of a
commission order to "any United States court of appeals for
the circut in which the violation is alleged to have occurred or
where the employer has its principal office, or in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia."46 An employer with a
multi-state operation will often have three options as to where
to file the petition for review. Thus the need for consistency is
obvious.
CONCLUSION
In an analysis of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
two goals must be considered. First is the maintenance of high
levels of safety in accordance with the Act's primary purpose.
Second, as in any statutory scheme, is the preservation of uni-
formity and logical interpretation of the various parts of the
law. Although the Bethlehem Steel approach seems more em-
ployer oriented, there is no sacrifice of safety under the defini-
tion used therein. The Secretary of Labor retains discretion in
issuing citations and proposing penalties which will serve as an
effective safeguard to the maintenance of high safety stan-
dards. Section 666 contains a number of penalty provisions
which the Secretary must match to the violation. The
Bethlehem Steel approach provides for more equitable use of
" 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970).
582 F.2d at 840.
29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
1062 [Vol. 67
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all such provisions. In view of the present state of the law in
this area, adoption of the Bethlehem Steel definition of
"repeatedly" would solve the problem by supplying consist-
ency and predictability to situations arising under this part of
the Act.
Earl Frederick Straub, Jr.
